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The intelligence test has been cited as psychology's most important technological
contribution to society. Whether this is good or ill can be debated (Eysenck,
1979; Gould, 1981; Herrnstein, 1971; Kamin, 1974). Certain facts are not really
subject to debate . Psychologists can and have developed "standardized interviews" that, on a population basis, provide a cost effective technique for personnel classification in industrial, military, and some government settings. However, the tests are very far from perfect indicators. Validity coefficients between
tests and performance ratings typically range in the .3 to .5 range (i.e. , from 10
to 25% of the variance in performance is predictable from test scores). While
such correlations may be high enough to justify testing in many situations, there
is a nagging feeling that better tests can be found .
The popular view is that a technology must be rooted in a science; in this case
psychological tests must be rooted in a science of mental competence. In fact, the
situation is not quite that simple. Psychology has two distinct sciences of mental
power. One, the psychometric study of intelligence (hencefOith psychometrics),
(2) is closely interwined with the development of testing itself. The other tradition , Cognitive Psychology, has historically stood apart from the study of individual differences. Yet, both study the human mind, in the human brain.
A number of years ago Cronbach (1957) urged psychologists to unite these
two disciplines. At one level the uniting took place. Cognitive psychologists do

IThe term " psychometrics" will be used throughout this paper to refer to the psychological
theories of mental competence that have been deve loped by applying correlational analysis methods
to test scores . The alternative meaning of psychometrics , as a branch of applied mathematics, will not
be used.
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look at individual vari ations, and the techniques of Cognitive Psychology are
used to study indi vidual di ffe rences. The resulting research , however, has had
rather little influence on the technology of testing . Is this because there is always
too long a lag between science and technology? Or is there a deeper reason? And
if there is a deeper reason , is there cause fo r al arm ? Should something be done to
accelerate the application of new scientific findings to psychologica l technology?
These questions are particul arly apt today because Cognitive Psychology and
a group of related disciplines, collectively called the "Cognitive Sciences," are
perceived as being extreme ly active intellectually. This is in marked contrast to
psychometrics, where the questions currentl y being debated are not terribl y
different from those that were debated over 50 years ago (Hunt , 1986a). Interest
in the technological potential of the Cognitive Sciences has been expressed at as
high a level as the Offi ce of the Pres ident of the United States (Holden , 1984) .
The interest in Cognitive Science has a strong technological bias. It is hoped that
advances in the study o f laws of cognition will lead to the deve lopment of a
technology of intelligent devices. These devices may expand the power of human
intelligence . They may also expand the effi ciency of our society 's very large
program of form al education , which is perceived as having substantial defects. It
is log ical to believe that the development of better methods to improve mental
competence will be closely linked to better methods of evaluating competence.
This view may be too optimi stic. The current fervor in the Cognitive Sciences
is based on real changes in our views of the mind . However, these changes are
derived fro m theories about cognition that are almost intellectuall y orthogonal to
psychometric theories of intelligence on which modern intelli gence testing is
founded . Previous writers have urged that psychometricians and experimental
psychologists unite in their study of the mind (Cronbach , 1957; R . J. Sternberg,
1977a, b; Underwood , 1975). They have proposed that the personal ability measurements of the psychometricians be added to the des ign vari ables manipulated
by the experimentali sts, so that the interactions between the two could be studied . This logic is epitomized by the phrase "aptitude x treatment interaction. "
The same logic is found , slightl y muted , in studies of cognitive correlates between psychometric and Cogniti ve Sc ience measures (Pe llegrino & G laser,
1979) . In both cases there is an implicit ass umption that di scovering the correlations between measures that have been developed in different inte llectual traditions will fu rther our understanding in both fi elds. In thi s paper some questions
are raised about the approach. T wo traditio ns can seldom be rammed together by
statistics. What is required is a theoretical synthes is that fu ses the m . If the
synthes is cannot be made the theories will probably co-ex ist, each covering
slightly different do mains.
Is the synthes is on the separate theory approach appropriate fo r the study of
individual di ffe rences in cognition? Thi s question can be only answered by
considering the present status of the psychometric and Cognitive Science views
of the mind , and asking whether they are compatible. Thi s question is explored
below. The sort of answer to be expected should be made clear. It is not a
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question of one approach being right and one being wrong . Neither is it a
question of technology versus science. The question is whether psychometrics
and cognitive science can be synthesized into a single view. If they can, then the
technology can be developed from a uniform scientific basis. If Cronbach's two
"camps of scientific psychology" are inevitably separate camps each may develop its own technology, which may be useful for different purposes.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF PSYCHOMETRIC THEORY
Since its inception psychometrics has been beholden to technology. Where
would test theory be without the number 2 lead pencil, the mark sense form, and
the calculating machine? The digital computer, which came somewhat later,
really did little more than cement intellectual trends that had already developed in
response to what, collectively, will be called the' 'paper and pencil technology."
The paper and pencil technology made it easy to record the products of
cognition. Note the stress on product. The paper and pencil technology is at its
best when large numbers of fairly short questions are presented and when the
respondent must choose from a fixed set of alternatives. The paper and pencil
technology is not well suited to recording how a person chooses the answers, and
is worse suited for situations in which free form responding is required. Perhaps
most important, the paper and pencil technology emphasizes counting the total
number of correct items or, in more recent applications, determining the most
difficult item that a person can consistently answer correctly. Thus, the conditions of the measurement procedure rule out observation of some psychologically
interesting behavior, and no amount of theorizing can put them back in.
The paper and pencil testing process has also been influenced by the economic
constraints imposed on personnel evaluation, largely in military and educational
settings. Because the test has been thought of as a one-time only measure on
which to base a long term prediction of a vaguely specified criterion, great stress
has been laid on measuring traits that are stable over repeated test administrations . Indeed, in many discussions of testing the correlations between test scores
taken at different times are regarded as measures of test reliability rather than as
measures of the stability of the examinee's ability to do whatever the test
requires.
These are reasonable strategies if the goal of prediction is accepted. The
decision to concentrate on stable mental traits does , however, rule out of consideration broad classes of behavior that could be considered part of intelligence. In
particular, measures of learning and of individual variability of performance will
not be measured . However, learning and personal stability could easily be regarded as part of a person's mental competence.
While any testing technology will be appropriate for some behavior and not
for others , the very success of paper and pencil testing has made its shortcomings
unusually serious. The behaviors measured on the tests have become the accept-
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ed definition of intelligence. The extent of this belief has been shown by reactions to some of the attempts that experimental psychologists have made to
establish theories of individual differences in cognition. Although these attempts
proceed from a very different tradition, and although atempts to reproduce correlations with traditional tests were specifically disavowed in one of the earliest
papers on these attempts (Hunt, Frost, & Lunneborg, 1973) people still evaluate
both their own (Keating, 1984) and other's (R. J . Sternberg, 1984, but for a more
balanced view see R. J . Sternberg, 1985) work in terms of correlations with
existing tests.
The paper and pencil technology has led to a particular type of theorizing. The
volume of data produced by giving batteries of tests to large numbers of people
has forced psychometricians to develop sophisticated statistical procedures for
data summarization and analysis. The natural way to represent a person' s test
scores is by a vector, and the natural way to summarize a vector is by a smaller
vector. Hence factor analysis, the art of extracting the small factor score vector
from the bewilderingly large vectors of test scores. The summary is well defined
mathematically . A person's abilities are represented by a point in a Euclidean
space of " mental abilities." The point is then mapped on a line representing the
(usually vaguely defined) ultimate criteria. As shown in Fig. 2.1, this is a
perfectly respectable way of making classification decisions .
The Euclidean representation has been used as a psychological theory of
intelligence, by interpreting the dimensions of the Euclidean space as basic
mental traits. The method is well known , so no further description is needed
here. (See Nunnaly, 1978, for a good introduction .) This is where the problem
lies. Factor analytic based theories do not provide an adequate conceptual basis
for thinking about individual differences in mental competence, except for the
restricted purpose of classification . Why is this?

ACCEPT
SPATJ AL
ABILITY

PRED I ClEO
JOB
PERFORMANCE

*- - - - --7

VERBAL

REJECT

AB I LI n

FIG. 2.1. The Euclidean mode l of me ntal ab ility . A person is conceptualized as
a point in a space of spatial and verbal menta l traits. Each point on the space can be
mapped into an acceptance or rejection interva l on a one-d imensional criteri on
variable .
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The usual objection to factor analytic theories is that the factor analysis as a
mathematical procedure does not lead to a unique Euclidean representation of the
data. Therefore subsidiary mathematical assumptions are made that, in effect,
dictate the psychological theory to be accepted (Gould, 1981). The biggest
argument is over whether one should insist that the dimensions, when interpreted
as traits, be mathematically orthogonal. The argument is not trivial, because the
orthogonality requirement mathematically precludes the discovery of separate
but correlated psychological traits. This and similar indeterminancies in the
mathematical solutions to the data analysis problem set the stage for a confusing
play of empirical observations. Different investigators applied different mathematical techniques to different data sets; producing a variety of claims for models
that vary from Spearman's (1927) classic "general" theory of intelligence
through hierarchial model of "general intelligence" of varying degrees, and
finally to the orthogonal specific abilities models exposed by Thurstone (1938)
and Guilford (1967) .
The trees may have obscured the forest. Carroll (1984) has done the field a
considerable service by applying consistent factor analytic procedures to some of
the major data sets reported in the literature. In it's simplest form, what Carroll
found is that most of these data sets can be fit by a " hierarchial general factor "
model of human abilities. Examples of such models are those espoused by Cattell
and Horn (Cattell, 1971; Horn & Donaldson, 1980) or by Vernon (1961). The
Cattell-Horn model seems to be the most accurate. It assumes that there are three
major classes of abilities. These are the "crystallized," and usually highly
verbal, ability to apply previously learned solutions to current problems (Gc), the
"fluid intelligence" ability to apply general problem solving methods to new
situations (Gf), and a "visualization" ability to deal with problems involving
visual-spatial relations (Gv). (There is some evidence for an analagous ability to
deal with auditory relations [Stankov & Horn , 1980]) . There is ample evidence
that these abilities are distinct, although Gc and Gf are correlated in most
populations.
One of the most encouraging things about the Cattell-Horn model is that it fits
reasonably well with neuropsychological analyses of brain function. These analyses are based on quite different sorts of observations about cognition; extensive
examinations of pathological cases . The match is particularly strong for Gv and
for Gc, interpreted as verbal ability, for there is massive evidence that spatialvisual and verbal information processing take place in different physical locations in the brain (Kolb & Whishaw, 1980). There is also some evidence for
selective forebrain involvement in the sorts of planning functions that appear to
be involved in the ability to plan and coordinate activities . At least superficially
this sounds like Gf, although it should be realized that the sorts of failures of
planning described for frontal lobe patients are much more extreme than those
associated with low Gf.
In summary, hierarchial models provide good summaries of the abilities
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tapped by paper and pencil testing. To a limited extent, we can make a guess
about where some of the information processing that underlies the tr~its identified in the models takes place in the brain. Clearly there is some reality to the
model, as a Euclidean description of human abilities . The problem is that it is
difficult to go further with any Euclidean model of cognition, because such
models provide relative descriptions of the products of thought without any
commitment to a model of the process of thinking.
Since this point is crucial, a hypothetical illustration will be given. Consider
the task of predicting how a person might perform on a test paragraph comprehension. A psychometrician could predict the total test score, by using a
formu la something like:
Predicted test score = a x (Examinee's Gf trait score)
+ b x (Examinee's Gc trait score),

where a and b are appropriately valued coefficients . But this predicts how well
the person will perform, not how.
To describe performance on the test one has to have a model of how a person
merges his or her general knowledge with the information in the text, in order to
construct a representation of the information in the paragraph , and then one has
to have a model of how the examinee interprets questions and interrogates the
internal representation of the text. These models deal with processes , not relative
outcomes .
Psychometricians are certainly aware of this problem . Their approach has
been to examine tests that appear, by mathematical criteria, to be relatively pure
tests of a trait. The hope is that an examination of such tests will lead to a better
understanding of what the trait means. This has worked relatively well for
spatial-visual reasoning (Gv), which seems to be composed of several definable
actions; holding bits of visual images in one's head, and moving images about
"in the mind's eye" (Lohman, 1979; McGee, 1979) . The approach has worked
much less well in the case of the more general "crystallized" and "fl uid "
intelligence traits. The relevant findings are very well summarized by recent
work by Snow and his colleagues (Marshalak, Snow, & Lohman, 1984; Snow,
1986). They used multidimensional scaling methods to construct a space of
various tests in which distances between tests approximated correlations between
them. Hence tests that define a factor will be grouped in tight clusters . A graphic
summary of some of their results is shown in Fig. 2.2. As the figure shows, there
are clusters that define the Gf and Gc factors. However the tests in these clusters
tend to be complex ones. Therefore people differ in their interpretation of the
behavioral capabilities needed to attack them. The well known Raven Progressive Matrix test (Raven, 1965), which is widely regarded as a good Gf
measure, is a good example. The test contains problems that yield to several
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FIG. 2.2. An abstracti on of the two dimensional space of mental tests developed
by Marshalek, S now, and Lohman (1 983) . Tests were located by a multidimensional scaling in which the distance between tests in the space is roughly proportional to the correlation between them; the higher the corre lation the less the
distance between test points. Some of the tests shown in thi s figure are I-Raven
Matrices, 2-Letter Series, 3-Hidden Figures, 4- Paper Form Board , S-Object Assembly , 6-Yocabulary , 7-lnformation, 8-Comprehension of verbal statements, 9Arithmetic problem solving, IO-Digit span, and I I-Locating A 's in a line of tex t.
Three groups of tests are shown , corresponding to fluid inte lligence (GF),
crystalli zed intelligence (GC), and visualization (G Y).

alternative strategies, each of which utilizes distinct elementary processing steps
(Hunt , 1974' . Therefore one cannot eas ily summarize the processes that the
Raven Matrix test tests. A summary that one person finds adequate will displease
another , and there is no way to resolve the issue .
R. J. Sternberg (J977a, b) has developed an alternative approach to the problem of definition of what a trait means. The technique is called "component
analysis. " One assumes that an examinee's overall test performance can be
broken down into components, where a component is defined as a process that
begins with a defined input from previous components and ends with a defin ed
output to be delivered to the next component in line . Consider analogy tests.
Each item is of the form
" A is to Bas C is to DI , D2, D3, D4"
e.g.,
" Cat is to Dog as Wolf is to (Lion, Giraffe, Elephant , Penguin)"

Such a problem can be solved in the following steps.
I . Code the meaning of the terms.
2. Establish the relati on between the A and B terms.
3. Appl y that relati on to map from the C term into an ideal answer.
4 . Locate that answer amongst the D terms th at most closely approximates the
ideal answer.
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The time required to answer a test item is assumed to be a linear function of the
time required to execute each component process, plus a "junk" term representing "all other processes involved." A similar model can be constructed for
estimating the probability of producing the correct answer as a function of the
probability of correctly executing each component process. A person's ability to
execute individual components can be estimated in two ways; by designing
modified test items that isolate one of the components (as was done in Sternberg's original work) or by constructing a factorial experiment in which the
experimental variables are chosen to modify the difficulty of one and only one of
the component processes (e.g., Pellegrino & Kail, 1982).
Componential analyses can produce very accurate partitions of variation in
performance on different problems within a particular type of test, averaged
across individuals . On the other hand, no one of the component process measures
seems to account for very much of the variance in inter-individual test performance. The "junk" parameter, which represents "encoding plus everything
else" is consistently the most accurate estimate of general performance in other
areas. This is disconcerting, for the processes contributing to the junk parameter
are not defined by the experimental variations . As a result , componential analysis does provide a better idea of what behaviors are required to take a conventional test, but componential analysis has not related these behaviors to a theory
of cognition, nor has it explained why some tests work as predictors in some
situations.
The criticisms that have been directed at the hierarchial model are not specific
to it. They can be directed at any trait theory of cognition. This does not mean
that trait theories are false, just that they have inherent deficiencies. Can these
deficiencies be remedied by combining psychometrics with cognitive psychology? To answer this question, let us take a look at the Cognitive Psychology
view.

THE COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY APPROACH

Cognitive psychology is based on an approach to the mind that is markedly
different from the Euclidean representation approach taken by psychometrics.
The modern (post 1970) approach has been strongly influenced by a variety of
other disciplines , notably by linguistics, neuropsychology , artificial intelligence,
psychology, and to a lesser extent cultural anthropology. These branches of each
of these disciplines that are concerned with thinking have come to be referred to,
collectively, as the ' 'Cognitive Sciences." This is an umbrella term for a collective movement toward the development of a unified theory of mind rather than to
multiple, discipline-specific models . Since modern cognitive psychology is best
underscored as part of this movement a few words about it are in order. The basic
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ass umption of the cognitive sciences is that there are laws that govern physical
symbol manipulating systems, somewhat akin to laws that govern physical phenomena. At a very general level, Shannon & Weaver's (1 949) theory of info rmation transmission would be an example of such a law . The term " physical
symbol manipulating system" is important. The cognitive science approach
ass umes cognition is achieved by the manipulation of symbols that represent
some external world . However the act of symbol manipulation requires some sort
of physical system. What cognitive science studies is the restraints placed on
symbol manipulation by the nature of the external world being represented , by
the nature of symbol manipulation itself, and by the physical character of the
system doing the manipulation.
Pylyshyn (1 983) has identified three levels of cognitive science studies. The
first is the study of the influence of physical mechanisms upon cognitive processing. This can be done by analyzing the one device that we know is capable of
thought; the mammalian brain . The cognitive and neurosciences merge here. A
complementary approach is to analyze the performance of hypothetical phys ical
devices, to see if they could perform the computations that are required to
achieve certain cognitive actions. Examples of such work are the study of the
learni ng and memory capacities of networks of idealized, neuron-like devices
(Hinton & Anderson , 198 1; Minsky & Papert, 1969) and analyses of the networks that can realize computations required in vision (Marr, 1982).
Pylyshyns's second level of cognitive science research deals with pure symbolic process ing capabilities defined without concern for the external referents of
the symbols being processed . An example would be the well known studies of
the scanning of info rmation in short-term memory (S. Sternberg, 1969, 1975) or
studies of the process of moving visual images " in the mind 's eye" (S hepard &
Cooper, 1982).
At the highest level are studies of thought processes that are controlled by
people's understanding of the referents of symbolic process ing . Examples of
work at thi s level are studies of problem solving and text comprehension. Johnson-Laird (1 983) has described this leve l of research as research on the mental
models that people construct and manipulate in the course of proble m solving.
For brevity let us refer to these levels as the phys ical, information processing,
and referential levels of cognition. C learl y the phys ical level is the most concrete, fo r an action of the mind must ultimately be an action of the brain . The
referential level is what we normall y think of as consc ious thought. T he most
abstract of the three levels is the in formation process ing level. Py lyshyn presented the levels as analogically simil ar to the stud y of computer circuitry, system
design, and programs within computer sc ience . A related , and perhaps somewhat
clearer, analogy is to think of studies at the phys ical (brain) level in humans as
being analogous to the study of computer hardware, studies at the representationa I level as being analagous to the stud y of the actions of particul ar programs,
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and studies at the information process ing level as being analagous to studies of
the operations permitted in a computer language in whi ch the representational
" programs" are written.
To provide a more specific illustration, consider the study of human verbal
comprehension. At the physical level there have been numerous studies showing
that language process ing in the brain takes place largely in the left hemisphere
(Kolb & Whishaw , 1980) . At the representational level we find studies of how
the info rmation people extract from a text is influenced by their level of knowledge of the topic, the text, and their beliefs about the use they will have to make
of the text-based information (Johnson & Kieras, 1983; Chiesi, Spillich, & Voss,
1979) .
The information processing level is the hardest level to define , because it
refers to processes rather than to phys ical structures, but the processes are not
open to conscious inspection. Continuing the analogy to computation , unraveling
the information processing elements of cognition is a bit like attempting to infer
the basic operations of a computer programming language by observing the
performance of programs written in that language. The problem can be illustrated
by considering the logic of the sentence veriftcation paradigm developed by
Clark and Chase ( 1972) . This procedure will be considered in some detail because it has been the vehicle for a reasonable amount of research on individual
differences. The procedure is shown in Fig . 2.3.
First a simple sentence is shown. The sentence is followed by a picture. The
participant must indicate whether or not the sentence correctly describes the
picture. Since errors are infrequent , the dependent vari ables are the time a person
requires to comprehend the sentence ("comprehension time" ) and the time
required to determine whether or not the sentence correctly describes the picture
( " verification time ") . These can be altered by varying the truth value and
syntactic-semantic form of the sentence. For instance , it takes longer to verify
negations than affirmations ( "Plus above star" versus " Plus not above star ")
and longer to veri fy sentences containing marked terms (" below") than unmarked ones ("above" ). The time required to carry out bas ic steps in linguistic

PL US NO T ABOV E STAR
(RE SPON SE)

*

+

(RESPO NSE )

FIG. 2.3. T he Se ntencc Ve rification paradi gm. A phrase is disp layed.
When the parti cipant indicatcs that
the phrase is undcrstood thc pi cture is
di splayed. The participant thcn determines whcther or not the phrase correc tl y desc ri bed the pi cture . The dependent variables are the times
between phrase display and co mprehension (comprehension time)
and pi cture di splay and ve rifi cati on
(verificati on time).
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information steps can be measured by observing how verification times change
when sentence forms are altered systematically. The logic can be extended to
individual difference research by determining how (or whether) the time required
to execute a specific lingui stic process varies across people .
Harking back to my earlier di scussion of Psychometrics, two major differences between the cognitive psychology and the psychometric approaches are
apparent. Both are particularly striking in studies at the information processing
and representational level. Cognitive psychology is 'interested in the process of
cognition , rather than the product. Thi s can be seen in the studies of verbal
comprehension just described , where the emphas is is on building a model of how
a linguistic statement is understood , rather than on specifying how likely a
person is to understand an arbitrary statement. The second diffe rence, which
follow s from the first, is that a cognitive psychology theory of individual differences must fit into a process model of the cognitive action being studied . The
cognitive psychologist is not particularl y interested in determining the dimensions of the Euclidean space adequate to describe individual's ability , relative to
each other. The cognitive psychologist is interested in knowing how variables
related to the individual impinge upon the process of that individual' s cognition.
This can be illustrated by looking at a series of studies on the role of shortterm memory in reading. There is a positive correlation between measures of
memory span and scores on omnibus written tests of verbal ability (Daneman &
Carpenter, 1980; Palmer, MacLeod , Hunt , & Davidson, 1985 ). Daneman and
her colleagues (reviewed in Daneman, 1984) asked why this is so. First it was
shown that higher correlations can be achieved if the measure of memory span is
one that directly refl ects the ability to hold information in memory while processing intervening linguistic statements, rather than one that reflects the " pass ive"
capacity to hold words in memory without doing some intervening activity . (The
memory span subjects of most intelligence batteries are of the latter sort.) Next,
it was shown that the ability to hold information in memory exerts its effect on
certain steps in linguisti c process ing, such as the ability to resolve anaphoric
references or to recall previously presented information when some reference to
it is required. Instead of stopping with the observation that reading comprehension and short-term memory tests load on the same fac tor , Daneman and her
colleagues examined the process of reading in order to determine what produced
the loading.
Because the emphasis of cognitive psychology is on process , experimenters
try to construct laboratory situations that isolate process . A cognitive psychologist may find performance in an isolated situation extremely interesting, on
theoretical grounds, even though that isolated situation does not draw upon
behaviors th at are called upon a great deal in the everyday world . Prediction is
not the point.
Measures of individual di fferences that relate to a theory of process are always
of interest, in the framework of that theory, even though variations in the mea-
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sures may not be highly related to variations in performance in any important
socioeconomic activity. Indeed, from a theoretical view some of the most important measures on an individual may be those measures that reflect constancies.
Years ago, Miller (1956) observed that there is very little absolute variation in
the human abilities to make perceptual judgments and to hold information in
short-term memory. The importance of these constancies for perception and
language comprehension is immense. Yet measures with low variability are not
good predictors.
Given the difference in philosophy, it is not clear that cognitive psychology
and psychometrics can be united. On the other hand, it is not clear that they
cannot. The problems are somewhat different at each of Pylyshyn's three levels
of the study of the mind.
The functioning of the mind depends on the functioning of the brain, so
questions about the relation between brain processes and mental processes are of
interest. The famous issue of hemispheric localization of function is an example.
So are studies of the influence of specific chemicals upon mental functioning;
e.g., the role of alcoholic intoxication upon memory. A great deal of technological development has gone into the construction of measures of functioning
of the physical brain, ranging from neuropsychological observations of behavior
to such exotica as tomographic scans (Mazziotta, Phelps, Carson, & Kuhl ,
1982). The technology provides an excellent way to study two things; the general
physical substrate of the normal mind and aberrations in mind that are produced
by specific, usually physical alterations in the brain.
The fact that the dimensions of individual variation uncovered by psychometrics do map reasonably well upon the brain functions discovered by neuropsychology is an important observation. The neuropsychological observations
are almost all based on the study of extreme cases, while the psychometric data
rests very largely upon the study of normal variation in mental competence
within a normal population . This suggests that there are sufficient differences in
brain functioning in the normal population to make a difference in at least some
of our behaviors, specifically those actions required by a conventional aptitude
test. In terms of the Euclidean representation of the psychometrician, the question is whether or not measures of brain functioning are sufficiently close to
psychometric measures to fit into the psychometric dimensional representation of
the mind. In more pragmatic terms whether or not brain function measures can be
related to everyday functioning in normal individuals depends on whether the
measures are related to behaviors shared by test taking and everyday cognitive
actions , or whether the brain function measures are mainly associated with
cognitive epiphenomena of the test itself.
From time to time there are reports that there are "substantial correlations"
between measurements of brain functioning and some extremely complex behavior, such as a general intelligence test. (S.ee Hendrickson, 1982, for a recent
example.) The vast majority of these reports have simply failed the crucial test of
independent replication . This is not to deny that the proposition that individual
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differences in brain functioning have something to do with individual cognitive
behavior. I am sure that they do, especially in extreme cases. As a matter of
scientific interest, studies of the relation between brain functioning and cognitive
behavior should and will be repeated. However it is not at all clear what will be
learned by studies that are confined to reporting correlations between gross
measures of brain function and gross measures of mental function; e.g., a correlation between a measure of the variability of the brain's overall response to a
repeated stimulus and performance on a general intelligence test. Unless the
correlations were extremely high (and again I repeat my caution about independent replication) all this tells us is that the general functioning of the brain is
related to general cognitive functioning. Did anyone doubt this?
Brain-cognition questions have a seductive physical concreteness. If tomographic scans reveal metabolic activity in a particular brain region during
certain sets of cognition (e.g., activity in the right hemisphere during spatialvisual reasoning) then surely this must tell us how we think . Unfortunately, it
does not. It tells us where we think. Brain function measures do not answer the
questions posed by the cognitive psychologist unless measures on the brain can
be associated with specific processes. To some extent this has been done, especially in the analysis of language comprehension, where the processes of word
and sentence comprehension have been disassociated at an anatomical level. It is
even possible that physical disassociations between different techniques for word
analysis will be discovered (Coltheart, 1985). Such work is certainly exciting,
but it is probably not going to have much influence on the relation between
psychometrics and cognitive psychology, since neuropsychology rests upon evidence from pathological cases. One must also remember that a process may be
distributed over several anatomical loci. So a failure to identify an anatomical
location for a process tells us little. There would be a need for information
processing studies even if we knew all there was to know about neuropsychology.
Early theories of information processing emphasized the isolation of stages of
symbol manipulation. In Fig. 2.4 is an example, taken from an early paper by
Smith (1968) , in which the act of selecting a response to a stimulus was broken
up into two stages of stimulus analysis and two stages of response execution. In
fact, this approach is the historic progenitor of R. J. Sternberg'S (1977a,b)
component analyses of intelligence tests . The strongest interpretation of Smith's
model is that there are distinct stages of information processing, that activity in
one stage is independent of activity in the other stages, and that the stages pass
information to each other in a serial manner. Thus a model like that shown in
Fig. 2.4 is really quite a strong statement about information processing . A more
general view is to regard thought as depending upon isolable subsystems, or
modules , of information processing actions that operate independently of each
other (Fodor , 1983; Posner, 1978). Each of the modules contains its own view of
some aspect of the external world. These views are eventually integrated into an
overall representation of what is going on . As an example of modular processing ,
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STIMULU S CL RSS IFI CRTI ON

RESPO NSE SELEC TIO N
\V
RESP ON SE EXEC UT IO N

FIG. 2.4. S mith 's (1 968) stage
model of stimu lus class ification and
response production. Each box is assumed to represent a d istinct psychological process . The processes take
pl ace in series, progressing from the
top downward .

consider what must happen when an automobile driver is told , verbally, by a
passenger, that the passenger would like to stop for dinner at the next restaurant.
Figure 2.5 shows the exchange of information between modules that must go on
inside the driver's head if the car is to be maneuvered into the nearest restaurant
parking lot .
The current " wi sdom " is that the integration of modular process ing that
occurs in cognition can be modeled by the use of a conceptual device known as a
production execution system. The basis of production execution systems is the
production , that is, a pattern and an action to be taken if that pattern is executed.
In Fig. 2. 6 is a slightly whimsical set of productions for driving a car. Each
module of thought can be conceptualized as the set of patterns and primitive
actions that are effected within by that module. Intermodule communication is
achieved by allowing modules to place their output either into the pattern area of
other modules or (more usually) by assuming a common " bl ackboard" area that
can contain patterns appropriate to any of the separate modules. This is illustrated in Fig. 2. 7 , which shows the organization of an hypothetical modular

FIG . 2. 5 . A modul ar approach to
cogniti on. Each box represents a
class of menta l processing, anal agous
to a spec iali zed work shop. In integrated thin king in fo rmati on is passed
back and forth between the di ffere nt
modules, and fi nally represented as a
coherent internal picture o f the ex ternal world . Process ing is not necessaril y serial.
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FIG. 2.6. Fragments of a set of production rules for driving an
automobile.
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1F THE LlGHT l S RED

THEN BRRKE

1F THE Ll GHT lS GREEN

THEN CONT1NUE

1F THE LlGHT l S YELLOW
RNO CRRS RRE 1N THE
1NTESECT10N

THEN BRRKE

1F THE LlGHT lS YELLOW
RNO NO CRRS RRE 1N THE
1NTERSECT10N

THEN RCCELERRTE

system of productions that might be required to execute the logical production
system stated in Fig . 2.6.
Thinking of thinking as organized modularity leads to an emphasis upon
certain classes of information processing functions. The first is the definition of
the modules themselves. Modules should not be thought of as stages in component processes (as described previously in discussing R. J. Sternberg's work) ,
but rather as specialized workshops containing resources to be assembled into
component processes. The distinction is roughly analagous to the distinction
between a hardware manufacturer, such as the Boeing Aircraft Company, that is
capab le of doing certain things , provided its shops are not overloaded, and the
stages in the process of constructing a specific aircraft, missile, or space vehicle.
lnformation processing research attempts to identify the modules and the
actions of which the modules are capable. This is done by inferring the existence
of a module , or of a process within a module, and by observing the selective
action of variables on certai n types of performance . An example is a widely cited
study by Biederman and Kaplan ( 1970) which demonstrated selective effects of
stimulus discriminability and response compatibility upon visual encoding and
motor response production systems . An alternative technique for inferring the
existence of separate modules is to show that action within one module does not
interfere with action in another module. This sort of reasoning is exemplified by
FIG. 2.7. The organization of an
information processing system for
executing productions. The productions res ide in long term memory . Informat ion is presented to the system
on auditory and visua l channe ls that
are connected to the external world.
The system can "keep notes for it- ·
se lf" by placing temporary information in work ing me mory, and using
this information to guide production
selecti on.
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dual task studies, in which people are asked to do ostensibly independent tasks.
If the tasks are done by separate modules it should be possible to time share the
tasks without interference . A good illustration is a study by Kerr et al. (1985) in
which main'taining one's posture was found to interfere with visual but not with
verbal memory tasks .
Once modules have been identified one can investigate the extent to which
each module displays variation across individuals . Similar studies can be made
of processes within a module. Logically, individuals are treated as factors in an
experiment, and one observes when differences associated with individuals
(e.g., age, sex, or sometimes simply individual identity) make a difference in the
performance of a task that is already known to involve a particular module. The
fact that the modules have been defined independently is what distinguishes the
experimental psychology of individual differences from psychometric investigations. In psychometric theory a "good" measure is defined by the pattern of
correlations involving it and other tests. In cognitive psychology the meaning of
the testing procedure will already have been defined, with respect to a pal1icular
theory of cognition, and will have been justified by the nomothetic experiments
done to validate that theory. The pattern of indi vidual differences is something to
discover, but the pattern does not validate the measure .
The approach can be illustrated by a further consideration of linguistic information processing. The modular character of linguistic processing has been
established by psychometric, neuropsychological , and experimental psychological criteria. In order to process language one has to know words . This is reflected
in the well known fact that (at least in young adults) vocabulary size is an
excellent indicator of one's general ability to deal with language. This is the
reason that vocabulary tests are often used as "markers" for verbal ability. Tests
of the speed of retrieval of the meaning of common words identify a reliable
dimension of individual differences. Furthermore, this dimension of ability is
distinct from the ability to manipulate strings of words, as tested in the sentence
verification paradigm (Hunt, Davidson, & Lansman, 1981; Palmer et aI., 1985).
These findings indicate that the language processing module contains two somewhat separate mechanisms, one for retrieving word information from long-term
memory and one for manipulating information after it has been retrieved. The
conclusion is buttressed by neuropsychological findings indicating that different
brain structures are involved in retrieval of word meaning and sentence analysis
(Kolb & Whishaw, 1980). Because sentence and word processing are not perfectly correlated they evidently make a distinct contribution to the psychometrician's verbal comprehension trait. Note the implied causality. Sentence and word
processing measures are not regarded as loading on an underlying trait of verbal
comprehension ability, they are thought of as producing that ability. On the other
hand , from the point of view of someone interested in prediction, a test that
mixed sentence and word processing into a general test of the ability to com-
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prehend language might be far more useful than isolated tests of the separate
processes .
Verbal comprehension depends on the integration of word information into
sentence structure, and sentence structure into discourse structure. Detailed models for both processes have been proposed (Kintsch & van Dijk , 1978; Schank,
1975). Both assume that what a comprehender does is to construct a structure
representing the meaning of the message being received. This is not a trivial task,
since the meaning of words and sentences will often be determined largely by
context. Substantial individual differences in the ability to define words in context have been observed , indicating that variation in fitting semantic meaning to
pragmatic context is a major source of variation in verbal comprehension (Hunt,
1985) .
Positive findings such as these fit well into hierarchial psychometric models
because they suggest that broad dimensions, such as "verbal ability," can be
broken down into more tightly defined traits. But what about negative findings?
One of the processes that facilitates the integration of words into sentences is a
nonselective "printing" process , in which topics that have already been identified increase a person's sensitivity to the recognition of related words (Foss,
1982). The usual example is that people shown the word "Doctor" are quick to
recognize the following word "Nurse." There is no doubt about the existence of
this mechanism or about its role in the processing of normal discourse . However
the priming mechanism appears to show little variation across individuals , and
therefore measures of it are poor predictors of relative verbal comprehension
ability (Hunt, 1985) .
From a cognitive science view, findings showing that there is a linguistic
information processing module, that it has subprocesses, and that the subprocesses sometimes show individual variation represent a start towards an information processing theory of verbal ability. Mapping the distribution of individual
differences, per se, (i .e., constructing the appropriate Euclidean representation)
is not a high priority next step. Studies that relate theoretically defined measures
to specific individual characteristics are far more interesting. For instance, it
appears that adult aging harms linguistic information processing at the level of
sentence and text integration (Cohen, 1979; Light, Zelinski, & Moore, 1982).
This is somewhat contrary to the psychometric observation that' ' verbal ability,"
as defined by certain psychometric tests, is relatively impervious to aging (Botwinick, 1977). How is this discrepancy to be resolved? Questions such as this are
central to a scientific understanding of individual differences, but may be much
less central to prediction of performance in wide-range situations.
The discussion of verbal comprehension illustrates how cognitive psychologists think about individual differences within an area of information processing
module. Cognitive psychology also stresses the process of integration of information across different modules, or across different sources of input. The dis-
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tinction is important. Studies of the exchange of information between processes
deal with the passage of information from one representation to another. Studies
of the way in which people deal with multiple sources of information focus more
upon people's ability to control the way in which attention highlights first one,
and then another, aspect of the current situation . Both of these concerns present
challenges for the psychometric approach, but for somewhat different reasons.
Virtually everyone who has examined problem solv ing has stressed the importance of forming a good problem representation . Perhaps the clearest example is
in high school geometry. Strictly speaking, geometric problem solving is an
exercise in syntactical analysis; well formed strings of symbols are to be written
into other well formed strings using a finite set of rules. Problem diagrams are
not logically necessary, but they certainly help . It is quite easy to show that
people differ in the representations that they use. Consider the sentence verification task. Most people solve this problem by comparing the meaning of linguistic
descriptions of the picture to the meaning of the sentence. These are people who
will use the sentence to construct an image of the picture they expect to see and
then compare it to the picture that they are actually shown (MacLeod , Hunt, &
Mathews, 1978) . Regularities in representation use can also be shown across
cultures. Ch ildren raised in a western European culture will attack an object
memorization task similar to the game "concentration " by developing a verbal
strategy of where the objects are . Desert dwelling Australian aboriginal chi ldren
treat the same task as one of memorizing a visual image (Kearins, 1981).
The fact that different people use different representations poses a major
problem for any trait model of cognition . Changes of representation may change
the type of information processing that is required to take a particular test. This
challenges a basic assumption of all psychometric methods; that the same linear
combination of abilities can be used to predict the test score of every examinee.
More colloquially, if representations change then there will be "representation
optional" tests that are verbal tests to some and visual-spatial tests to others.
When representation optional tests are included in psychometric batteries they
will give erratic results, because their loadings will depend on the freq uency of
use of different representations in the population being tested. (Sentence verification tests provide mixed results when used with college students, but seem to be
purely verbal tests in populations of older people [Hunt & Davidson, 198 1] .) By
a sort of Darwinian logic, representation optional tests drop out of intelligence
testing, because they do not fit well into the Euclidean model of ability description. But, from a cogn itive sc ience view, knowing the sort of representations a
person likes to use is one of the most important pieces of information that you
can have about problem solving ability.
Colloquially , we sometimes say that a person failed to solve a problem because their attention wandered. The ability to control attention during problem
solving appears to be an important source of individual difference. This ability is
usually tested by giving people several tasks to do in a short time period, and
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seeing how well they are able to cope with streams of information from different
tasks. The tasks involved are almost always very simple ones, such as detecting
whether or not a particular word has occurred in a string of words presented to
the right or left ear (dichotic listening), or determining whether a signal has been
presented at a particular location in the visual field. These simple tasks are
studied because they are believed to be key components in a variety of very
complex machinery operating tasks, such as flying an airplane.
Early research suggested that there are no reliable individual differences in the
ability to do several things at once, apart from the ability to do each of the tasks
singly . This early work has been criticized, however, on methodological
grounds , and a reanalysis of key studies indicates that the abi lity to share one's
attention across several tasks ("time sharing ability ") is a reliable dimension of
individual differences (Ackerman, Schneider, & Wickens , 1984; Stankov ,
1983). Research identifying just what time sharing ab ility is , is in its infancy .
However, we do have some indications of its nature.
Time sharing must involve some capacity for controlling attention. People
who are good either at focusing attention on one auditory channel (e.g., li stening
to a speech against a background of conversation) or splitting attention across
two auditory channels (listening to a conversation while talking on the telephone)
are not necessaril y the people who can focus or split attention across the visual
field, but there is a substantial (.60) correlation between measures of control of
attention within each modality. This suggests that there are both inter and intra
modality mechanisms involved (Lansman, Poltrock , & Hunt, 1983). There also
seems to be a reliable dimension of individual differences in the abi lity to shift
attention from one stream of input to another. Examples are the task of shifting
from listening to one ear in a dichotic presentation to listening in another, or
shifting from following one sequence of visual symbols to following another
(Hunt, 1986b; Hunt & Farr, 1984). We do not know the relation between "attention shifting" ability and the "attentional control" ability identified by Lansman
et al. (1983).
The abi lity to control attention is not tested by conventional psychometric
procedures . There are two reasons why. One is that the motivation for studying
individual differences in the control of attention is based partly on a desire to
predict how well people will operate machinery in highly demanding, time
limited situations. Again aircraft operation is the best examp le. The sorts of
processes being tapped in attentional control studies are simply not an issue in the
educational and business settings applications that fuel many psychological studies of intelligence. There is also an intentionally practical reason for avoid ing
studying attention in a psychometric framework.
The procedures required to evaluate the control of attention are, to put it
mildly, not easily included in the usual psychometric testing situation. The tasks
are complicated so the participants must receive a careful explanation of them. In
some cases up to several hours of practice may be needed before a person's
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performance is stable enough so that he or she can be tested . All of these
considerations mitigate against the "large N" studies upon which psychometric
technology depends. However, there is no way to shortcut the precautions. As
was pointed out earlier, cognitive psychology develops procedures that are justified by their relevance to a theoretical model. Any use of these procedures must
contain internal checks to make sure that the model still applies. In the case of
studies of attention, the procedures and the internal checks will often be so
onerous as to preclude their use in conventional personnel evaluation settings.
This pragmatic fact does not diminish the theory , nor does it diminish our
scientific interest in individual differences in attention.
Previous remarks have focused on the conceptual limits of the psychometric
approach. It is worth noting that in the case of studies of attention, cognitive
psychology has also been myopic . "Attention" has been conceived of as something that a person throws from one place to another, in response to an environment that demands an instantaneous response. This is a realistic model for
skateboarders, all the time , and for airplane pilots some of the time. in most
human endeavors, though , the cognitive environment demands responses within
minutes , hours, or even days . The person doing the thinking usually has a good
deal of freedom in scheduling the order if different cognitive tasks are to be done.
This is a very different situation to study within the technologies of both psychometrics and cognitive psychology, because it means giving control of the situation over to the participant. And once this is done, the examinee has control over
what is to be measured . Understandably both psychometricians and experimental
psychologists avoid such situations. However difficult to measure, the ability to
structure one's environment may be the key to successful thinking . This becomes
apparent when we consider the topmost level of cognitive psychology, the study
of conscious, specialized problem solving.
Complex problem solving is very much influenced by the representations that
problem solvers choose to use , so understanding the process by which representations are developed, selected, and chosen for use has become a central goal of
cognitive psychology. Because the choice of optional representations is very
heavily influenced by learning, any theory of representation in problem solving
has to be , in effect, a theory of how a person acquires and uses knowledge. The
effects of representation owning on representation having are multiplicative, not
additive.
This point has been illustrated in a striking way in studies that show how the
information that a person extracts from a situation depends upon the person's
representation of the situation itself. Chiesi, Spillich, and Voss (1979) offered a
good illustrative study in a rather trivial field , recalling an account of a baseball
game . People who were familiar with baseball could construct a representation of
the plays being described. This caused them to focus on game relevant information, which they were subsequently able to recall. People not familiar with
baseball were not able to do this , although they were able to recall game irrelevant information contained in the broadcast.
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At one level, such an observation is hardly surprising. "Everyone" knows
that people recall more about events that they understand. But this is precisely
the point. Understanding and learning are problem solving situations, in which a
person ' s current knowledge is used to structure new knowledge. The topic of
Chiesi et al. experiment may have been trivial. The principle was not. Exactly
the same point can be made (after a much more complicated analysis) by studying the way in which students acquire knowledge of plane geometry, or of
computer programming (Anderson, Boyle, Farrell, & Reiser, 1984). And consider a still more detailed analysis of a very important activity . Carbonell (1978)
was able to simulate conservative and liberal interpretations of political events
using a program that applied identical information processing mechanisms to
merge the statements with different representations of political and social forces .
What one gets from experience depends very heavily upon one's interpretation of
it.
The psychometric view is quite unsatisfactory here. Saying that people differ
in their ability to use common, culturally defined solution methods (the definition of Gc) hardly captures the process of representation use. Amplifying the
statement by saying that content knowledge extends Gc in specific fields is only a
small step forward, for the psychometrician is still operating within the Euclidean representation of cognition. Regarding 'applying knowledge' as a trait does
not discriminate between the possession of knowledge and the ability to see that a
particular piece of knowledge is relevant to the problem at hand. It is fairly easy
to demonstrate·that the two are not synonymous. People can be given exactly the
appropriate knowledge to use in problem solving, but in a slightly different
context, and be unable to apply it. Some people see connections where others do
not (Gick & Holyoak, 1983) , but why? What processing differences are there
between people who do and don't make generalizations? This is another example
of a question that is central to a science of individual differences but not particularly crucial to a technology for prediction.
The issue being raised here is quite a broad one, for it has to do with the way
in which "culturally acquired knowledge" is used. While some knowledge
consists of ready-made answers to questions of fact, for example, much cultural
knowledge consists of ways of representing problems so that their solution can be
achieved . The representations form skeletons that guide thought, directing one's
attention to key aspects of the problem at hand and suggesting particular solutions. Different theorists have used the terms "schema, " "frame, " and
"script" to describe this process. These terms all reflect what seems to be a
universal characteristic of human thought. The world is often ambiguous or
overwhelmingly complicated. People bring order into this chaos by assuming
that the world satisfies the constraints implicit in their world view. Successful
problem solving is largely a process of trying out one or another constraining
representation until one is found that works. To give a concrete example, consider the problem solving process of expert physicists. They recognize specific
problems as instantiations of a generalized class of problems (e.g., balance of
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force problems). Once recognition has been achieved problem solving methods
associated with the general class can then be applied to solve the specific problem. Novices are likely to focus on aspects of a problem that are not relevant to
the general classification principles (e.g., is a sliding block involved?), leading
to the use of general, but clumsy problem solving methods. (Chi, Glaser, &
Reese, 1981; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon , 1980).
The realization that most problem solving is achieved by context specific
methods marks a major change in Cognitive Science. Early work on artificial
intelligence and human problem solving placed great emphasis on the discovery
of general problem solving methods (Hunt, 1975). More recent studies have
emphasized area specific knowledge (Feigenbaum, 1977; Hayes-Roth, Waterman, & Lenat, 1983). The same trend has been evident in cognitive psychology,
where research has shown the extreme importance of topic specific schemata as
guides in problem solving.
If this trend was to be taken to its extreme, generalized psychometrics would
be, if not impossible, at least greatly changed. The whole idea of "intelligence"
is that there is some mental characteristic of the individual that applies to many
problem solving situations. An emphasis on the use of schema in problem solving does not completely deny this notion , for some schema will have wide
applfcability, especially in educational settings. Arguing again by illustration,
Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) have shown that understanding of a text is driven
by schema that specify the form of argument in different types of text (stories,
scientific reports, etc .) . Obviously , it is possible to design tests to see whether or
not people possess these general schema. Such tests are likely to be useful
predictors of ability to function in places where general schema are used. Educational settings immediately spring to mind . Tests of general schema use are not
likely to be of much use in predicting performance in situations in which effective local schema operate. People appear to be able to function quite well with a
local schema even though they are not terribly comfortable with a related, more
general problem solving procedure.
Some recent studies of the learning and the use of mathematics and logic
provide excellent examples of this point. Mathematics and logic are often
thought of as the purest, most abstract , and most general problem solving methods. At least in academic circles , an argument can be justified solely by appealing to its logical purity. When children learn mathematical problems they learn
them as schema (Riley, Heller: & Greeno, 1983). Much of the difficulty in
mathematics appears to be in translating from a nonmathematical statement of a
problem into the appropriate schema (Kintsch & Greeno , 1985). At a grander
level , the abstract schema of mathematics are so hard to learn that the ability to
do so is often considered in itself a hallmark of intelligence .
If mathematical reasoning is so difficult, how does the modern world function? To take a specific example, how do people calculate the price of products in
a supermarket? People are quite good at doing so, even though pricing informa-
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tion is not always presented in the most straightforward way (Lave, Murtagh, &
De la Roche, 1984). The same people are not good at solving simple arithmetic
problems, when those problems are presented outside of the shopping context.
Lave et al. found that shoppers made errors on only 2% of the pricing problems
presented in an actual shopping context and on 41 % of the problems presented in
an abstract arithmetical context. This was true even though the same arithmetic
operations were used in each case. Furthermore the two tests were not reliably
correlated! Further probing showed that the shoppers had a variety of problem
solving procedures that were specialized for shopping and that were quite adequate for problem solving in that context.
Shopping is not the only place where people exhibit context-specific specializations of a logic that, in some abstract sense, they really do not understand .
Ceci and Liker (1985) have reported a study similar to Lave's using an even
higher order skill, statistical decision making . Inveterate horse race bettors have
to determine whether the odds offered by the track are actually a good estimate of
whether or not a horse will win. (The racetrack odds are determined solely by the
amount of money bet on each horse, and do not reflect an explicit analysis of the
horse's ability vis a vis its competitors.) Some individuals can "beat the odds"
reliably. It is possible to formulate what they do as a complicated statistical
estimation problem. But the racetrack handicappers were far from being untutored, brilliant mathematicians. In fact, their formal intelligence test scores
were well below undergraduate norms . The skilled handicappers had developed
complicated, race-track specific techniques for handling an unusually complex
problem in decision making.
None of these remarks will be new to those familiar with studies of cross
cultural cognition. Specialists in this field have long pointed out that the Western
emphasis on "intelligence" emphasizes the ability to do problem solving in the
abstract. The very idea of abstract problem solving seems to be related to Western European schooling (Cole & Scribner, 1974) . While this may be true , it does
beg a very important point. The Western European schooling situation, with its
emphasis on abstract problem solving, may indeed be a cultural phenomenon .
However, it is an important, useful phenomenon. Skills in logic , mathematics,
and general problem solving are an important part of our culture, even these
skills are then specialized as people find their niche in society. Therefore identifying people who are likely to become good general problem solvers is a reasonable endeavor.
This is where the concepts of Gc and, to a lesser extent, Gf, are likely to be
useful. Let us accept the fact that high scores on Gc tests identify those people
who have acquired the problem solving schemata of our society. Those are the
very schemata that are going to be used in the classrooms , to aid people in
acquiring further decontextualized knowledge . Perhaps we could design better
tests is we had a better idea of how the educational process proceeds, because we
would then know what schemata are going to be required, when, and (perhaps)
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how they should be learned. Furthermore, at least in theory Western schooling is
supposed to develop an ability to generalize ; that is to see how problem solving
schemata learned in one setting can be applied in another. It may be that tests of
Gf identify people who can make such generalizations. If we had a better understanding of the process of schemata generalization we would know what it is that
these people are doing, and then could develop better tests for their identification.

THE UNION OF THE CAMPS
Cronbach (1957) sought a uniting of two camps of scientific psychology; the
study of individual differences and the study of nomothetic influences on cognition . The prospects for uniting these camps is excellent. However, the study of
individual differences is not identical to the use of a Euclidean representation of
mental abilities. The prospects for uniting psychometrics and cognitive psychology are mixed , and for perfectly good reasons.
The paper and pencil testing technology and its accompanying Eucl idean
representation are hard to beat, so long as one's criteria are cost effective evaluation , and predicting is to a situation that involves very general behavior that
depends on decontextualized reasoning processes . Education and , to a lesser
extent , military life are examples of such situations. Traditional psychometric
evaluation has not , and probably will not , be extended successfully to the prediction of performance in more specific situations, where adequacy depends upon
the ability of an individual to execute situation specific, schema based , and
perhaps complex information processing sequences . Note that the problem here
is not that the paper and pencil technology is inadequate to construct such
situations. The problem is that the underlying Euclidean representation of mental
abilities cannot be used to formulate a process model of cogn ition .
Enter the computer. My frequent references to "paper and pencil technology" may have sounded archaic to those who are already programming
computer presentations of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the Armed
Services Vocational Battery, and any number of other intelligence tests . Doing
so will certainly make testing more efficient , as witnessed by current developments in " item banking" and latent trait theory (Green et aI. , 1982). Furthermore, computer presentations are more fl ex ible than paper and pencil presentations, so the Euclidean model can be extended to new domains. Some possibilities are extensions of spatial-visual testing to the situations involving moving
visual displays (Hunt & Pellegrino , 1985) and the development of practical tests
of auditory information process ing (Stankov & Horn, 1980). We may have to
add a few dimensions to the Euclidean model, or we may not. Either way , the
expansion of the traditional model via computerized testing will be a useful
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exercise. In itself, though, computerized testing will not address the conceptual
issues that have been raised here. There is every reason to believe that a theory of
individual differences can be developed as a subtheory of a general theory of
cognitive psychology and will result in a better understanding of how individual
variables such as age, education, sex, and genetics influence the processes of
problem solving. To what extent will or will not this theory influence the technology of testing?
It is now technically possible to develop automated laboratories, so that the
experimental psychologist can collect data on enough individuals to study individual differences. In the abstract, one could conceive of the development of
even larger laboratories devoted to assessment and prediction. Such laboratories
would immediately encounter another economic limit; the expense of the evaluation to the examinee. The sorts of measurements required by cognitive process
theories are often extremely time consuming. The equipment is relatively complex, so that the examinee must spend considerable time learning to use it before
any data can be collected. This and several related problems are very well
discussed in Longstreth's (1984) excellent critique of the misuse that has been
made of choice reaction time paradigms in order to fit them into an evaluation
setting. A point that was made earlier is more than worth repeating . The measures developed from cognitive process theories are valid only when the boundary conditions for measurement are met. This requirement may forever prevent
developing cognitive psychology analogs to the ten to twenty minute tests so
common in psychometric batteries .
These remarks apply with particular force to any testing program based on the
information processing aspect of cognitive science. Because such tests are likely
to be expensive, testing itself will of necessity be limited to those situations in
which prediction is important and in which performance is limited by a person's
information processing capacity, once that person has acquired the specific
knowledge required to perform at all. This suggests two guidelines for applied
research. If information processing models are to be useful, then the test constructor must have a good idea of how information processing limits performance
in the situation to be predicted . Two cases can be imagined. In one the key
information processing requirements are not situation specific, and hence may be
tested using some manageable testing paradigm. In the other case the information
processing limits may be definable only in context, and hence can be tested only
in the actual situation or an adequate simulation of it. If this is so it may not be
possible to test examinees who do not already have a good understanding of the
job for which they are applying . In either case the test constructor cannot proceed
without a situational model. One can imagine such a model for specific situations, such as aircrew or radar operation. A detailed model of the information
processing required in high school is unlikely.
At first glance a theory of the use of representations might seem to be of little
use in personnel evaluation because, by definition, representations are used by
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people who have already acquired experti se in some field of endeavor. Ergo they
must have already been permitted entry to the field . Fortunately this logic can be
reversed . If " becoming an expert " means acquiring certain problem solving
schema, why not evaluate a student by determining the extent to which the
expert's problem solving schema have been internalized? Developments in Artificial Intelligence have led to at least the claim that we can represent expert
knowledge inside a computer (Hayes-Roth et al. , 1983; but see Dreyfu s &
Dreyfus 1984 fo r questions about some of the evidence on which the claim is
based). "All " that needs to be done is to apply the interview methods used to
extract knowledge from an expert to extract (faulty) knowledge from a student.
To aid teaching, the evaluation process can be made the basis for further specialized instruction .
Efforts are underway to develop just thi s sort of intelligent computer aided
instruction system (Anderson et al. , 1984 ). The teaching goals appear to , be
in reach in nontrivial fields (computer programming and geometry). Whether or
not the evaluation goal is feas ible remains to be determined . The present intelligence tutoring programs seem to make a rather general guess at the student 's
current state of knowledge , and use that guess to select problems that are most
educational for that student. Whether or not the program's guess about the
student's representation is sufficiently accurate to be predictive remain to be
seen.

CONCLUSION
Cronbach thought that general theories of psychological process ought not to
ignore individual diffe rences, and vice versa. He was right , and in a general
sense the union of the camps is well underway. In my opinion (and here there
may be a violent di ffere nce of opinion! ) the way to achieve the scientific union is
to concentrate on understanding how individual differe nces variables, such as
age, sex , genetic constitution, and education, influence the processes of cognition. It does not seem particularly fruitful to try to derive the dimensions of the
psychometric Euclidean representation of abilities fro m an underlying process
theory.
This does not mean that the Euclidean model is wro ng, within the context in
which it has been developed . Consider an analogy to what we know about
experti se. Experts develop local schema that apply to their local problems. The
psychometric Euclidean model is an excellent way to deal with personnel prediction and classification. But it does not generali ze well to understanding cognitive
actions. Einstein was certainl y intelligent , in the psychometric sense. However
he did not develop a single one of hi s intellectual conceptuali zations because he
was high on Gc or Gf. He developed them because he had certain sche ma for
problem solving and because he had the info rmati on processing capac ity to apply
these schema.
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Eventually there may be a "Grand Unified Theory " of psychology, similar to
those now being developed for physics. But will we understand it? There seems
to be a role for Newtonian mechanics even after quantum theory. Engineers use
the limited Newtonian notions all the time. Psychometric and cognitive process
theories may similarly co-ex ist for many years. Practical application and power
of conceptualization are both worthwhile goals. They are not necessarily
synonymous.
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